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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
include an inquiry into the merits, 57 this inquiry is limited to
whether the alleged acts, out of which the cause of action has
arisen, have been committed, and may not include a determination
of whether those acts were wrongful.
CPLR 302(a)f1): Constitutional limit not reached.
While New York's long-arm statute, CPLR 302, has greatly
increased the power of New York courts to exercise in personam
jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries, a question has arisen as to
whether CPLR 302 has gone as far as is constitutionally permissible:
CPLR 302(a) (1) gives personal jurisdiction over non-domi-
ciliaries who have "transacted business" in New York, out of
which transaction a cause of action has arisen. The courts have
been liberal in applying this section in commercial cases.-5  This
is contrasted with the restricted application of CPLR 302(a) (2)
in tort cases.59 A recent case, however, gives some indication that
CPLR 302 (a) (1) does not reach the permissible limit of in per-
sonam jurisdiction.
In Kramer v. Vogl,60 plaintiff sought fraud damages. The
defendants, Austrian firms, had contracted to give the plaintiff the
exclusive right l to sell the defendants' product in the United
States. The contract was consummated in Paris and a letter con-
firming the exclusive sales agreement was sent to the plaintiff's
office in New York. The defendants did not engage in sales, pro-
5 Since jurisdiction under CPLR 302 depends upon the commission of
certain acts within New York by the non-domiciliary defendant, a court
deciding the issue of jurisdiction must make determinations on the merits,
i.e., whether the defendant transacted business in New York (CPLR
302(a) (1)), or committed a tortious act within the state (CPLR 302(a) (2)),
or owned or possessed property in New York out of which the action arose(CPLR 302(a) (3)). Any determination on the merits made by a court
concerned solely with jurisdiction, however, is not binding on the court trying
the merits. E.g., Vernon v. Rock-Ledge House, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 98, 266
N.Y.S.2d 556 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966); Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378,
143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).58 E.g., Lewin v. Boch Laundry Mach. Co., 16 N.Y2d 1070, 213 N.E.2d
686, 266 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1966); Johnson v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y,
16 N.Y.2d 1067, 213 N.E.2d 466, 266 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1966); Singer v. Walker,
15 N.Y2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905
(1965).
59 Since the decision of Feathers v. McLucas, there has been no doubt
that CPLR 302(a) (2), dealing with the commission of a "tortious act,"
does not approach the constitutional limit. In that case, the Court of Appeals
held that the language of that subsection clearly precluded its applicability
to any case wherein the act which produced the injury in New York was
committed outside the state. Feathers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 460,
209 N.E.2d 68, 77, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 21 (1965).6o 17 N.Y2d 27, 215 N.E2d 159, 267 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1966).
61 An exception was made in the contract for one named customer. Id.
at 29-30, 215 N.E.2d at 160, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
[ VOL. 41
1966 ] NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE 293
motional or advertising activities in New York, nor did they employ
any local salesmen in the state. The defendants merely shipped
goods to dealers in the state who had placed orders with them.
The court held that CPLR 302 (a) (1) does not apply to a non-
resident who never comes into New York and only sends goods
into New York pursuant to orders from within the state. The
court, however, reserved judgment as to whether it would be con-
stitutional for a state to exercise jurisdiction in such a case by
means of a statutory enactment. 2
CPLR 302(a)(1): Neither contracting by mail nor the acts of an
independent broker are a sufficient basis for jurisdiction.
In A. Millner Co. v. Noudar, LDA.,"3 the defendant in Portu-
gal sent a letter to the plaintiff, an independent sales broker in
New York, offering to make the plaintiff its sole sales outlet for
its goods in the United States and Canada. The plaintiff accepted
by mail. The defendant, pursuant to orders, shipped its goods to
purchasers in New York, and, on occasion, officers of the defendant
came to New York to engage in sales on the defendant's behalf.
The court, in reaffirming case law prior to the CPLR, held that
the acts of the independent broker could not serve as a basis for
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.6 4  Thus, the CPLR's
substitution of the "transaction of business" test for the CPA's
"doing business" test 6 has not altered this principle.
The court held that neither the shipping of goods into New
York nor the mailing of a contract into New York was a sufficient
basis for jurisdiction. The court noted that while the mere mailing
of an insurance contract into a state is a sufficient basis for juris-
diction,"" it could not construe CPLR 302(a) (1) in a like manner
for commercial contracts.
The court ultimately upheld jurisdiction, however, on the basis
of the acts performed by the defendant's officers, who negotiated
sales in New York. This factor was considered to be a sufficient
"transaction of business," since it was an attempt by the defendant
while in New York "to effectuate . . . a purpose directly related
to ... [its] economic affairs ... " 167
-
62 1d. at 32, 215 N.E.2d at 162. 267 N.Y.S2d at 904.
63 24 App. Div. 2d 326, 266 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1st Dep't 1966).
64 Greenberg v. Lamson Bros. Co., 273 App. Div. 57, 75 N.Y.S.2d 233
(1st Dep't 1947); McKeon v. P. J. McGowan & Sons, 229 App. Div. 568,
242 N.Y. Supp. 700 (2d Dep't 1930).
65 CPA § 229-b.
6 N.Y. INs. LAw § 59-a. This procedure with respect to insurance contracts
was held constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
117A. Millner Co. v. Noudar, LDA., 24 App. Div. 2d 326, 331, 266 N.Y.S.2d
289, 295 (1st Dep't 1966), citing Insull v. New York World-Telegram Corp.,
172 F. Supp. 615, 629 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 273 F2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 942 (1960).
